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safeguards. In order to counteract the pressure brought to bear upon
administrative agencies by private groups to secure permits to remove
dunes, in appropriate situations the North Carolina Attorney General's
Department should use the public trust doctrine to protect coastline
property. Although the guidelines should be spelled out in specific terms
by our legislature, the attorney general should not hesitate to invoke the
doctrine as enunciated in the case law.
FRANK B. JACKSON
Environmental Law-Water Resources-Zones of Shared Conservation
Authority and United States Public Policy
The exercise of conservation authority must be understood in the
context of the conservation movement as a living and evolving ethic in
the American conscience. Many writers trace the emergence of the
conservation movement as a real force in the United States to the
Governor's Conference of 1908 called by President Roosevelt and the
subsequent work of the National Conservation Commission.'
In the beginning, this movement generated a great unity of purpose
and direction. The Commission's scientists focused the laws of man on
the laws of nature. The Commission itself contributed the concept of
resource management to the movement by publishing an inventory of the
nation's resources. Yet as the movement grew it began to fragment, for
one of its essential characteristics was the propensity to attract
exceptionally diverse groups. Those who placed nature's highest values
in the aesthetics marched to the cause alongside the sportsmen, the
lumbermen, the developers, and other groups who understood nature's
utility value. While each group could agree on the general concept of
conservation, their specific interests conflicted.
William Howard Taft, who followed Roosevelt into office, once
remarked that conservation was such an abstruse subject that many
people were for it no matter what it meant.2 His remark captured the
essential weakness of the movement. In the eyes of the political scientist,
the form of the classic political struggle-which is the basic ingredient of
the democratic process-surfaced in the conflict of the group interests:
'See, e.g., N. WENGERT, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE 22 (1955).
2
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PERSPECTIVES ON CONSERVATION 8 (1951).
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"Like the warp and woof of a fine tapestry, decisions in this field are
made up of many elements and influences, crisscrossing and interacting,
yet not without pattern and design."13 The purpose of this note is to
examine the expression of that pattern in the nation's water resource law
within the framework of shared authority demanded by the federal
system.
FEDERAL AUTHORITY
Federal authority over the nation's waterways is not based on an
express constitutional grant of power. By judicial construction and
legislation, federal authority over the nation's maritime law was forged
from federal jurisdiction over commerce and navigation. In Gibbons v.
Ogden the Supreme Court stated that commerce "comprehends
navigation." ' 4 The Court faced the issue squarely in Gilman v.
Philadelphia, where it stated that "[c]ommerce includes navigation"
and that for that purpose all the nation's navigable waters "are the
public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation
by Congress."
'5
At the same time, however, the courts recognized that the states had
a proprietary interest in the rivers and riverbeds, subject to the
acknowledged federal jurisdiction. The technical title to the beds of the
navigable rivers of the United States remained either in the states in
which they were situated or in the riparian owners of their banks,
depending on state law. 6
Perhaps Martin v. Lessee of Waddell' provides the most explicit
statement of the interrelation of state and federal power over the nation's
rivers. There the Court declared that "when the Revolution took place,
the people of each state became themselves sovereign; and in that
character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and the
soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights
since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government."
8
From that paramount qualification developed the general rule that the
3N. WENGERT, supra note 1, at 3.
'22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
570 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865).
6See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 60 (1913).
'41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
81d. at 410.
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United States held a superior easement in the flow of the nation's rivers
based on its powers over commerce and navigation.9
After substantial judicial expansion of the commerce clause
throughout the nineteenth century, Congress boldly enacted the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899.1" Section ten of that Act
prohibits the creation of obstructions in any of the waters of the United
States." Section thirteen forbids the discharge of any refuse other than
local sewage unless such discharge is pursuant to a permit granted by the
Corps of Engineers. 2 The strength of these prohibitions reflects the deep
concern of Americans over the "threat of pollution at the turn of the
century. It is paradoxical, however, that despite the apparent concern the
real potential of this legislation would lie dormant for nearly seventy
years.
ZONES OF SHARED AUTHORITY
Large areas of responsibility were left open to the states as the
outline of a federal system of control over the nation's waterways began
to emerge. Generally, the states exercised their inherent police power
over the use, distribution, and conservation of water resources within
their borders. Yet the flow of the nation's river systems did not always
respect state boundaries, and infrastuructures evolved within the federal
framework as compacts or agreements were signed by the states. From
the first, Congress liberally granted its constitutionally required 3
consent to such compacts, and then by a statute enacted in 1948
Congress gave blanket consent to any such compact entered into for the
purpose of conservation or pollution abatement." Compacts were a
possible vehicle for bringing interstate action to the river basin.
However, development of the nation's water resources was soon
dominated by a new concept of conservation. American technology was
capable of producing the giant hydroelectric dam. Many conservation
groups could identify their interests with the multi-purpose dam and its
ability to provide flood control, irrigation, electric power, pollution
'3 PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, vATER RESOURCES LAW 25 (1950).
"oAct of March 3, 1899, ch. 425, §§ 1-22, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.).
"33 U.S.C. § 403 (1964).
"233 U.S.C. § 407 (1964).
"U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
1433 U.S.C.A. § 1154(c) (1970),formerly 33 U.S.C. § 466(b) (1964).
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control, and wildlife protection. Conflicting group interests reached a
consensus in the theory of multiple use, which acknowledged the twin
goals of conservation and economic development of nature's resources.
The multiple-use doctrine was written into the Federal Power-Act of
1920.15
The passage of the Federal Power Act foreshadowed federal
dominance over river-basin development, and Congress marshalled most
of its delegated power to take control. In 1950 the President's Water
Resource Policy Commission Report referred to the use of the
commerce power, the proprietary power, the war power, the treaty
power, and the general welfare power by Congress." Strong economic
forces also shaped resource policy at the federal level. Huge multi-
purpose projects provided desperately needed work for those individuals
displaced by the economic disasters of the 1930's.
Federal dominance over the river basin began to emerge when the
Supreme Court announced that all "navigable waters [were] subject to
national planning and control in the broad regulation of commerce
granted the Federal Government." 7 One year later the Court recognized
that it was "for Congress alone to decide whether a particular project,
by itself or as part of a more comprehensive scheme, [would] have such a
beneficial effect on the arteries of interstate commerce as to warrant
it."'" In the same case the Court rejected the proposition that a federal
multi-purpose project could be halted when that project interfered with
the state's own program for water development and conservation., 9 By
1957 the following comparison of federal and state controls was made:
The federal government now dominates in the fields of navigation,
flood control, hydroelectric power development, irrigation and river
basin planning. The states dominate in the fields of water rights, urban
water supplies, drainage, and fish and wildlife management. The
responsibilities are more shared in the fields of power regulation,
recreational planning, pollution control, and small watershed
development.20
The multi-use doctrine had greatly altered the federal scheme.
1516 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1964).
"13 PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, WATER RESOURCES LAW 5-70 (1950).
"United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940).
"Oklahoma exrel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,527 (1941).
"Id. at 534-35.
2"Englebert, Federalism and Water Resources, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 325, 330 (1957).
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NEW Focus ON SHARED AUTHORITY
The 1960's brought the conservation movement full circle. The
science of ecology exposed the public to the concept that man exists in a
closed ecosystem. The ethic acquired a new dimension in the knowledge
that all life on earth is interdependent and that nature's delicate balance
is severely threatened by pollution. Congress responded to protect what
it saw as the public interest and passed several major amendments to the
1948 Water Pollution Control Act.21 Each amendment preserved the
original policy of the 1948 Act, which left primary responsibility for
pollution control in the states, but each addition staked out a new federal
framework in the structure. By 1970 a clumsy system of pollution
control had evolved, generated by the establishment of federal water-
quality standards and enforced by a conference procedure, a hearing
procedure, and court actions in abatement.
The threat of environmental degradation has placed a new burden
on the institutional patterns of shared authority. The establishment of a
conservation policy of pollution control must be accomplished within a
new matrix of authority. First, water pollution is a local concern in the
sense that it must be abated at the source. Local governments exercise
the kinds of authority which must be used in pollution abatement: the
power to zone and to grant the certification for certain uses of the water
resource. In addition, water pollution in the river basin generates
regional conflicts, as when, for example, a city in one state pollutes much
of the downstream river basin in another state. Finally, institutions
under public control-such as public utility installations regulated by
state governments, local sewage systems, and large naval bases operated
by the federal government-have been identified as major contributors
to water pollution.22
Public demands on these institutions can be expected to produce
adjustments within the federal structure with regard to the exercise of
resource policy. A trend in the exercise of federal authority surfaced
recently in a report submitted to Congress by the House Standing
Committee on Governmental Operations.2 The Committee severely
criticized the Federal Water Pollution Control Act on the following
grounds: (I) federal water-quality standards apply only to waters that
. 1See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151-75 (1970).
nH.R. REP. No. 1433,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1970).
=H.R. REP. No. 91-917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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flow interstate; (2) abatement proceedings must be postponed until 180
days after notice of the violation of the Act is served; and, (3) abatement
proceedings under the Act can be instituted only with the consent of the
governor of the polluting state. The Committee compared the scope of
the enforcement powers of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act with
those of the older Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 and
discovered that the 1899 Act has none of the limitations imposed on the
more recent legislation, which provides that it shall not be construed to
affect or impair the prohibitions of the 1899 Act.24 Thus seventy years
after its passage, Congress rediscovered the potential of one of the
nation's earliest pollution controls.
In bold-face black type the Committee admonished the Corps of
Engineers to enforce vigorously the 1899 Act. Several methods of
enforcement are available under the Act. The Corps may seek an
injunction in the federal courts or request that a polluter remove a
discharge voluntarily 5 Or, according to a recent Supreme Court case,
the government can do the work itself and then bill the polluter for the
cost if the polluter's conduct was wilful or negligent. 21 Finally, the Corps
may seek a criminal sanction under the Act. Recently, in Zabel- v.
Tabb,2 1 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited, quoted, and
relied on the Committee report and stated that it "stifles any doubt as to
how this part of Congress construes the Corps' duty under the Rivers
and Harbors Act [of 1899].''2s
The most novel aspect of the Committee report was its suggestion
that the ancient qui tam action be used to implement the criminal
sanctions of section sixteen of the 1899 Act. Section sixteen imposes a
fine of not more than 2,500 dollars and provides that "one-half of said
fine [shall] be paid to person or persons giving information which shall
lead to conviction. ' 2 The qui tam action arises where a statute such as
the 1899 Act provides that part of the fine shall be paid to citizens who
furnish sufficient information concerning a violation to convict the
violator and the government fails to prosecute within a reasonable period
of time. The informer can then sue the violator in the name of the
2133 U.S.C.A. § 1174 (1970).
"United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
"Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
-430 F.2d 199 (1970).
28d. at 214.
-33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
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government to collect his portion of the fine." Because of this possibility,
the 1899 Act appears to be a potent weapon in the federal arsenal.
CONCLUSION
The gradual evolution of the conservation ethic has produced a
substantial change in the nation's resource policy. The idea that there is
a public responsibility-even a public trust-involved in man's relation
to his natural environment has distinctly emerged. Pressures are building
on both the public and private sectors to carry out their fiduciary duty.
However, decision makers at every level of public activity are faced
with a dilemma. The sheer magnitude of environmental degradation
demands a unity of action, and yet the authority to deal with the
problem resides at all levels of government. The weakness of the current
pollution-control legislation was recently described in the President's
proposals for improving the environment, which were submitted to
Congress on February 8, 1971. 31 Radical new innovations, such as the
elimination of the cumbersome enforcement conference and the hearing
procedure of the present law, were included in the presidential proposals.
Also, there was a proposal requesting Puthorization for private legal
actions against violators of water-quality standards in order to bolster
state and federal enforcement efforts.
Notwithstanding the innovation represented by the President's
proposals, the basic fault of the Water Pollution Control Act was not
recognized: Pollution of the river basin remains basically a regional
problem, but there was no proposal to shift the present state-centered
authority over pollution control to regional authorities. Because the river
basins have no respect for state boundaries, and in the absence of
adequate federal legislation, successful pollution abatement in the future
will depend upon the ability of the states to coordinate the sharing of
intrastate as well as interstate zones of authority over the river basin.
MICHAEL R. SCHOENENBERGER
1On August 13, 1970, the Governmental Operations Committee report was supplemented by a
carefully researched report by its subcommittee on the qui tam action. Organized as an outline for
citizen action under the 1899 Act, the latter report reviews the history of the action and cites the
constitutional authority for it. See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 91ST
CONG., 2D SEss., Qui TAM AcTiONS AND THE 1899 REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAWSUITS AGAINST
POLLUTERS OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS (Comm. Print 1970).
31U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Feb. 22, 1971, at 73.
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